I agree that theory is transhistorical, but so is narrative. Historians have always looked at the past through the lens of the present, they just do so a little bit more conscientiously today.

It helped me realize how much we historians have to dilute some of this theory to make it useful to us. I also think that theory is used to political ends in history that sometimes are different than the theorists’ original intentions.

These theories and stories become founding myths for different paradigms in my opinion.Great stuff, all.

One of the reasons why historians have traditionally resisted theory was because it was transhistorical. Theory claimed to provide universally-applicable explanations of how and why things happened. Historians were skeptical, to say the least, since they saw massive variation in how human societies operated and thought at different times and places. I think historians need to be careful that they don’t become wedded to any particular theory, lest they start seeing everything through that particular lens.

The obsession with agency in modern historical discourse might be fruitfully compared with Mormon teachings on the subject someday. Mormons might also have some useful things to say about identity.

Thanks for the link and for the excellent commentary. You obviously have a better grasp on some of these theorists than I do, and I think our discussion has been enlivened by your participation. It helped me realize how much we historians have to dilute some of this theory to make it useful to us. I also think that theory is used to political ends in history that sometimes are different than the theorists’ original intentions.

I think David’s and Clark’s exchange begs the question about whether power, in itself, is inherently oppressive or undesirable. If so, then do we have to pick our poison?

To me one of the big errors of some self-styled postmodernists is the idea that power is something that can be escaped. We are always already in a world. And the word is the expressions of power. The Derridean (as opposed to Foucalt) take on this is much more in line with Heidegger’s authentic/inauthentic categories. The authentic is letting things be which is always bringing new lines of power into the situation. And the authentic/inauthentic shouldn’t be taken as moral categories (although I think Heideggarians push that a tad too far at times). Rather they are just two modes of being which are always operational in humans.

The big mistake I see way too much is folks seeing lines of power and then somehow thinking these are intrinsically good or evil. Yet if good and evil are themselves conceived of in terms of power then how on earth could one make such a claim?

All of this takes one back to Levinas instead of Foucalt though. Levinas says that what ought count as primordial is the demand of the Other. Something “in excess” of power. Yet Derrida’s critiques of Levinas in “Violence and Metaphysics” can’t be understated since violence is basically an other word for a certain kind of power manifestation. The question is how to conceive of both power and Other. I think that Derrida critiques both the early Levinas as well as Foucalt in how they conceive of this. Levinas reacted to Derrida’s critiques. I’m not sure Foucalt did beyond bad mouthing Derrida to Searle.

You’re right. I misspoke in the original post.

One example that Derrida highlights is the modern obsession with binaries like good and evil, moral and immoral, or black and white. While I believe that good and bad exist in the world–I think that they are often portrayed in an overly simplistic way. Derrida would probably go much further and argue that the way that society constructs what is “good” and what is “bad” is is wrought by relationships of power.

As I read Derrida his point is both stronger yet more subtle than that. He’d say our representations of good and evil are the results of power relationships yet I think he’d simultaneously say there is a real ‘good’ that exceeds my understanding. The great error is that we confuse our particular nexus of power that choses our position as if it were universal, when it is not. But I’d add (although I can’t recall off hand where Derrida says this in so many words) that this doesn’t mean Derrida rejects the universal of Good. Rather he is completely focused on such universals. (As I said I can’t think of Derrida talking of the Good off hand. But he talks a lot about universals like justice, giving, and so forth)